Host Identity Protocol (HIP) emerges as the most suitable identification protocol for the Internet of Things. HIP not only provides identifier/locator split but also a key agreement procedure named HIP Base Exchange, which bootstraps security associations between HIP peers. However, the heterogeneous and decentralized nature of IoT architecture, coupling resourceconstrained networks with powerful Internet, impedes the use of HIP Base Exchange on small devices due to its computationally expensive cryptographic operations. In this paper, we propose a (k, n) threshold distributed key exchange protocol designed to reduce the requirements of HIP Base Exchange, in order to be supported by resource-constrained nodes.
INTRODUCTION
The current transition from legacy Internet to Internet of Things (IoT) involves multiple changes in its communication paradigms. The diversity of scenarios where internetworked entities have to exchange information with each other without human interaction is increasing and is planned to extend to almost all environments, from individual customers' everyday life to industrial processes. Accordingly, more and more objects become able to communicate, following as a rule of thumb an always greater interaction with the physical world, which is not only timely and accurately sensed but also understood and acted upon. Wireless sensor networks [1] were the first step in this direction. Machine to machine (M2M) communications [2] largely extended the sensor networking model, inheriting its resource-limited, unguarded and mass deployed nature while developing it through embedded intelligence and self-organization. M2M environment also broke the logical and topological simplicity of sensor networks, wherein sets of constrained devices, geographically close to each other, used dedicated gateways to eventually send aggregated data to remote management units. In the M2M world, asymmetric communications between extremely different, distant and, sometimes, mobile devices are likely.
The IoT further extends the M2M paradigm into two directions. First, it aims to interconnect much wider sets of objects, even those that were natively not supposed to be able to communicate. Second, the IoT targets universality and global interoperability whereas most M2M architectures are dedicated to the fulfillment of a single given task.
Even more than the legacy Internet nodes, IoT nodes require a global identification and naming scheme. In accordance with identification, shared secret establishment capability has to be provided for any two nodes that know each other's identifiers. However, the underlying cryptographic algorithms are either too heavy to run on resource-constrained nodes, or they do not provide a satisfactory security level.
In this paper, we propose to delegate cryptographic computational load to less resource-constrained nodes in a collaborative scheme, through exploiting the heterogeneity of IoT nodes. We present a lightweight key exchange protocol for the Internet of Things, which allows a highly resource-constrained IoT node to obtain assistance from more powerful nodes in order to securely derive a shared secret with a peer. Section 2 highlights the need for provable identity, and reviews solutions aiming at providing it, putting a special emphasis on HIP protocol. Section 3 describes the proposed energy efficient cooperative key agreement scheme for IoT nodes. Our solution bases on HIP Base Exchange (HIP BEX), which we extend to distribute its heavy computational operations to collaborating nodes. Two distribution techniques are detailed in this section. Section 4 discusses the performances of the proposed techniques as compared to standard HIP BEX approach. Section 5 concludes this paper.
IDENTIFICATION AND SECURITY IOT CHALLENGES
An identification scheme for the Internet of Things must be able to encompass the multiple identification systems that exist in local topologies of communicating objects (e.g. sensors, tags), while maintaining compatibility with legacy Internet. It must support nodes mobility and multi-homing. Beyond these two features, often presented as the rationales for decoupling identifier and locator in the legacy Internet [3] , the IoT introduces specific scenarios that require aggregation (e.g. reverse multicast wherein multiple nodes share a common identifier) or resilience (e.g. support of sleepy nodes through a gateway transparently masquerading as them). These latter functionalities further strengthen the need for an identifier/locator split. Due to the lack of a global security infrastructure for IoT, the underlying identification scheme should also be able to bootstrap a secured context between two IoT nodes, which are not expected to acquire more knowledge on each other than their respective identifiers, prior to establishing a secured context. There is therefore a need for an identification protocol providing identifier/locator split, identifier ownership and key agreement.
The Identifier / Locator Split Paradigm
Intuitively, it sounds reasonable to use different values for specifying to whom a data unit should be sent, and to which location it has to be routed, the underlying concepts being entirely different. A single node may very well change its location, and two different nodes may successively be located at the same place. Furthermore, an application sending a data unit is only interested in the recipient's identity, while the routing components in source and intermediary nodes are only concerned with the recipient's location. However, legacy Internet mixes the two concepts [5] , using the IP address both for addressing (locator role) and naming (identifier role). A number of protocols [4] , [6] , [7] have thus been proposed in order to introduce identifier / locator split in IP-based systems, typically by adding an identification layer above the IP layer.
As explained in the introductory text of this section, two IoT nodes that must securely connect to each other will often not know more than their respective identifiers. One cannot assume, for example, the existence of a worldwide PKI that would take charge of nodes mutual authentication. However, in order to use their identifiers as security enablers, IoT nodes should be able to treat these identifiers as trustworthy.
This requirement can be fulfilled through the use of a secure resolution system, which is foreseen in the Internet of Things. Indeed, the IoT resolution is expected to work as follows: a node A wanting to contact a node B relies on an advanced resolution system to which it provides a set of attributes, in order to perform discovery, look-up and resolution [8] of the desired peer. For example, a node A may ask for "a nearby temperature sensor", or for "the closest milk pack". Contrary to the legacy Internet DNS, the advanced resolution system of IoT has therefore to be trusted: whereas a value returned by legacy Internet DNS can be crosschecked (e.g. by asking the resolved node to provide its certificate and verifying its content), a value returned by IoT resolution system has to be trustworthy, since cross-checking mechanisms are not likely. Therefore, node A will both trust that node B offers the requested feature/service and that the identifier of node B is the one it retrieved from the IoT advanced resolution system.
Identifier Ownership and Key Agreement
Having established that the identifier retrieved by A can be trustworthily assumed to be B's, we still have to explain how this identifier can be protected, so that only B can use it. Otherwise any attacker could simply spoof the (valid) identifier received by A and masquerade as B. This is where the concept of a "secure identifier" comes into play: a secure identifier is an identifier that cannot be spoofed, that is, an identifier that only the legitimate owner can use. In order to achieve this functionality, this identifier must be univocally bound to a public key, whose private counterpart is known only to the legitimate owner. Thus, proving the ownership of a certain identifier amounts to proving the ownership of the related public/private key pair.
In the context of a secured session establishment, mutual authentication is needed in order for both nodes to be insured that they have established a shared secret with the right peer. This insurance is essential to provide protection against Man-in-theMiddle (MitM) attacks. To that aim, multiple Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols have been specified. In the field of Internet of Things, the AKE protocol should leverage on nodes' secure identifiers.
Rationale for the use of HIP
The Host Identity Protocol (HIP, [4] ) leverages on the identifier / locator split paradigm. It introduces an additional HIP layer on top of the IP layer. HIP layer uses cryptographically protected Host Identifiers (HIs) to identify the sender and the recipient of a data unit. In order to prevent node impersonation, HIP provides a secured Base Exchange (BEX) mechanism, in which a HIP initiator contacts a HIP responder and agrees with it on a shared secret. Afterwards, HIP relies on IPsec security to ensure that no intruder breaks into the secured session and that the communicating peers remain the ones that performed the BEX procedure. Hence HIP fulfills the requirements of identifier/locator split, identifier ownership and key agreement.
Among the Internet identification schemes, HIP and SHIM6 [7] are the only alternatives where identifiers are cryptographically protected. In practice, the maturity of HIP, its usability on various devices [10] , [12] , its support of interoperability mechanisms [11] and, as seen above, its ability to securely and straightforwardly derive a shared secret, make it the most likely solution to be used in the Internet of Things.
HIP Base Exchange (BEX)
The objective of the HIP Base Exchange (BEX) is to perform authenticated key agreement between two HIP peers designated as the initiator (I) and the responder (R). The entire exchange is depicted in Figure 1 . The message I1 initiates the exchange. Upon reception of I1, the responder sends a (possibly pre-computed) packet R1 composed of a puzzle, its Diffie-Hellman (DH) public key, its public key (Host Identifier) and a signature (for node authentication). At this stage, the responder remains stateless and waits for the initiator's response. This latter has to answer this message with an I2 packet, composed of the puzzle solution (used to protect the responder against DoS attacks), its own Diffie-Hellman public key, its own public key (its Host Identifier) and a signature. Once the responder has validated the puzzle solution, it can confidently proceed to the computation of the Diffie-Hellman session key. Finally, with a last packet R2, it finalizes the exchange and sends a (signed) MAC computed with the generated DH session key to the initiator for key confirmation.
The HIP Base Exchange involves heavy cryptographic computations on both initiator and responder. The most requiring part is the computation of two modular exponentiations for the generation of the Diffie-Hellman public keys and the setup of the Diffie-Hellman key. Signatures computations and verifications over messages R1, I2, R2 are still also non negligible operations from the point of view of a highly resource-constrained node.
Lighter HIP Declinations
From this observation of the heavy computational host of HIP Base Exchange, two modifications of HIP have been proposed in order to make the protocol lighter.
HIP Diet Exchange (DEX)
HIP Diet Exchange (DEX) [13] proposes that a node uses a longterm Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH) public key as its Host Identifier. DEX then adapts the key exchange, as depicted in Figure 2 .
Figure 2: HIP Diet Exchange (DEX).
The Host Identifier being itself the Diffie-Hellman public key, there is no need to authenticate it through asymmetric cryptography: the knowledge of the DH session key is enough to prove that a node is a legitimate peer in the exchange. Accordingly, this DH session key is used to transport two random seeds x and y that are eventually used to derive the final secret.
As compared with HIP BEX, the use of long-term public DiffieHellman keys eliminates the need for their ephemeral counterparts and hence, the generation costs of those. Likewise, the use of Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman and the fact that no other asymmetric cryptography operation is required make the key exchange lighter. Yet, even ECDH-based key exchange is too heavy to be supported by a highly resource-constrained node.
Lightweight HIP (LHIP)
Lightweight HIP (LHIP) [14] is a much more radical approach, which keeps the same message syntax as in HIP BEX for compatibility reasons but does not use any of the HIP BEX security mechanisms. No Diffie-Hellman key is computed, no RSA operation is performed and no secure IPsec tunnel is set up after the exchange. Instead, hash chains are used to cryptographically bind successive messages with each other, which represents a minimal degree of security. LHIP procedure is depicted in Figure 3 . Note that the DH R , DH I , PK R and PK I message fields are present in the exchange but are unused in standard LHIP exchange except when upgrading to standard HIP BEX, which LHIP allows.
Figure 3: Lightweight HIP (LHIP).
LHIP trades security for energy efficiency in a drastic manner. Its security level is therefore very low: only HIP control messages (e.g. supporting node mobility) are integrity-protected through hash chains. These latter only guarantee that an ongoing session has not been hijacked (temporal separation property) but do not provide strong node authentication. Besides, HIP data messages are not protected since no key exchange mechanism is provided.
PROPOSED SOLUTION: DISTRIBUTED HIP EXCHANGE (D-HIP) 3.1 Overview of the Protocol
The main rationale of the proposed D-HIP protocol is to make a highly resource-constrained node able to benefit from HIP functions and to establish secure contexts with other unconstrained nodes within a heterogeneous IoT architecture. D-HIP modifies the BEX and proposes to delegate its heavy cryptographic load to less constrained nodes in neighborhood. During the key exchange, these assisting nodes, called later "proxies", take charge of the session key derivation, performing the authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange in a distributed and collaborative manner. Each proxy takes part in the computation and delivery of the resource-constrained initiator's DH public key. When receiving the responder's DH public key, proxies participate also in the computation of different parts of the DH session key before its recovery at the initiator.
Considering a highly resource-constrained initiator I that needs to establish a HIP connection with a powerful responder R, the process of our proposed protocol is composed of the following phases:
 Selection of the supporting nodes P i at initiator to collaboratively set up the session key with the responder.
 Delivery of required key materials and authorization proofs to supporting nodes in order to act on behalf of the initiator.
 Preparation and split phases of the secret exponent a generated by I, and delivery to the proxies, followed by the authenticated transport of different parts of the initiator's DH public key from each proxy to R. 
Considered Architecture
Our network model considers a global IoT infrastructure that interconnects heterogeneous nodes with different capabilities in terms of computing power and energy resources. We especially consider in this paper three different types:
 Highly resource-constrained nodes, unable to support the computation cost of the asymmetric cryptography operations required by BEX or DEX but requiring a security level much more advanced than the one afforded by LHIP.
 Other nodes at neighborhood, less constrained, able to perform with restriction cryptographic operations. These nodes may either be dedicated assisting servers or nodes belonging to the same local infrastructure, though being less impacted by energy constraints (e.g. having harvesting capability).
 A network server with high energy, computing power and storage capabilities (e.g. line-powered remote servers).
Protocol Description

Preparation of Involved Entities
As an initial phase, the initiator carefully selects the P 1 … P n proxies that will support its HIP key exchange, based on the reputation of the nodes and their actual resource capabilities.
As stated above, our solution requires that these nodes contact the responder and send it messages on behalf of the initiator. Hence authorization and authentication questions arise at the proxy side, since these nodes should be provided with an initiator's representativeness proof. This proof could be a certificate including the proxy's public key associated with the right "authority to sign on behalf of I", all of which are signed with the initiator's private key and delivered 'offline' to the proxy, regardless the current exchange. However the use of long-time authorization certificates can be diverted for malicious exploits. Hence, the certificate should include other dynamic parameters added by the initiator in order to restrict the ability of proxies to act on its behalf, such as the identity of the responder R, a session nonce, or an expiration date. In this case, the authorization proof should be delivered 'online' to the proxy during the protocol exchange. Nevertheless, managing dynamic certificates would be hindering for the initiator.
For this reason, we propose to move the computational load required to dynamically manage authorization proofs from the initiator to a local trusted entity T, which will be the only entity able to assert that a proxy node is authorized to sign on behalf of the initiator.
Since the verification of each proxy's certificate would be heavy for the responder, we rely on one way accumulators [16] to authenticate participants within the same group. One way accumulators are based on one way hash functions which satisfy a quasi-commutative property. Thanks to this property, members of a group (x 1 , …, x n ) agree on accumulated hash of their identities y = H(x 1 , …, x n ) and each participant keeps this hash function H, its identity x j and an accumulated hash y j for all other participants of the group x i≠j . To prove its membership, it needs to present the pair (x j , y j ) in order to verify that H(x j , y j ) = y. We retained this scheme in order to make a node able to validate its membership to the group of selected proxies at the responder side. Using this technique, the responder only has to verify the signature of the accumulated hash for all proxies of the group instead of validating the signature of each proxy's certificate apart.
Having received the identities of the selected nodes, T securely provides each proxy with an accumulated hash of all other participants except P i , H P , , P , P , , P with H() being a commutative one-way hash function, along with a T-signed message consisting of:  H P , , P , an accumulated hash of all proxies identities  I's Host Identity Tag, which will make R aware of the node obtaining assistance from the proxy  Nb_P, the number of selected proxies Upon receiving their proof material, proxies are prepared to participate to the collaborative D-HIP process.
Creation of HIP Association
The packets exchange that makes up our protocol is illustrated in figure below, and detailed later in this section. The first packet, I1, initiates the exchange. Once the responder has agreed on the proposed cooperative technique, it answers with a second packet, R1, to start the actual exchange. R1 contains the responder's Host identity HI R and a puzzle consisting of a cryptographic challenge that the Initiator must solve before continuing the protocol exchange. The difficulty level of the puzzle is adjusted based on the initiator's trust level and resource capabilities. As mentioned above, the HIP puzzle exchange is a way of defense to protect the responder (and eventually proxies in D-HIP) from denial-of-service threats. This latter remain stateless until the receipt of a valid response from the initiator. Once I receives the packet R1, it computes the solution of the received puzzle. Then, it securely transmits it with the message R1 to the selected proxies in the packet I21 i . The process of the rest of the packet R1 is moved from the constrained initiator to proxies.
The packet I21 i is also used to deliver n shares a 1 , …, a n of the secret exponent a appended with the (g,p) parameters to the n proxies retained for assistance, in order to make these proxies able to compute different shares of the initiator's DH public key. The computation of a i from the secret exponent a is detailed below in this section. The packet I21 i also contains the puzzle solution along with the responder's Host Identity. Upon reception of the packet I21 i , the proxy P i checks the packet R1's signature and may validate the puzzle solution, in order to mitigate the risks of DoS attacks from the Initiator. If the packet is verified correctly, P i computes its part of the initiator's DH public key mod and sends it (signed) to the responder along with the puzzle solution, the proxy's Host identity HI Pi and its authorization proof in the packet I22 i .
In turn, the responder begins to check the authorization proof of the proxy by validating its belonging to the group of selected nodes asserted by T. It checks then the validity of the received puzzle solution. Without a correct solution the packet I22 i is rejected. Else, the responder confidently continues with the protocol exchange by verifying the integrity of the received message using P i 's public key. After having received the expected number of proxies' messages, the responder retrieves the initiator's DH public key (g a mod p) from the g ai mod p received from the proxies. The method for retrieving g a mod p from these values depends on the partitioning technique used to obtain the n a i shares from the secret exponent a. Two such techniques are presented below in this section.
Having recovered the initiator's DH I , the responder can already compute the DH session key. On the initiator side, we propose to delegate the corresponding computational load to the proxies in a distributed manner. In order to enable this distributed computation, the responder sends to each proxy P i a packet R21 i containing a share B i of its DH public key. The way this share B i is computed also depends on the initial partition scheme of I's private exponent a. The R21 i packet also includes a HMAC calculated over HIT I and HIT R with the DH session key. This HMAC serves to prove the correctness of the established DH session key and thereby guarantees its freshness as in HIP BEX. The entire packet R21 i is signed with R's private key.
Upon reception of the packet R21 i , the proxy P i checks its signature and uses the B i value it contains to build a share K i of the DH session key, defined as K i = B i ai mod p. P i then securely provides the initiator with a final packet R22 i that includes K i and the responder's HMAC.
Using the received K i shares, the initiator becomes able to reconstitute the DH session key g ab mod p, using the procedure described below, in either of the following two subsections. The initiator finally verifies the HMAC for DH session key confirmation.
In the two followings subsections, we describe two techniques that we introduce in order to distribute the computations required by the Diffie-Hellman protocol and therefore to enable our D-HIP key exchange protocol. For each of these techniques, we explain how the initiator's DH private key is shared among the proxies (how I computes a i ), how the responder retrieves the initiator's DH public key from the proxies' g ai mod p, how the responder computes the shares of its own DH public key (how R computes B i ) and how the proxies use B i to obtain the K i shares of the DH session key K DH , eventually used by I to retrieve K DH .
Secret Exponent Integer Partition
The technique described in this subsection is the simplest approach for enabling distributed DH key exchange. The secret exponent a of the initiator is split into n parts a 1 , … , a n chosen such that:
As explained above, each proxy delivers to the responder g ai mod p. The computation of the initiator's DH public key eventually amounts to the product of the values received from the proxies, following:
On turn, the responder sends a share B i of its DH public key to each proxy P i . With this first simple partition technique, B i is equal to the responder's DH public key for each proxy. The computation by each proxy of the share K i of the DH session key occurs then as follows:
Eventually, the computation of the DH session key is made by the initiator, which obtains K DH as:
According to this expression, the resource-constrained node only spends n-1 modular multiplication operations instead of two modular exponentiation operations, with exponents of considerable length (a and b should have twice the length of the generated secret K DH , as per [15] ).
Secret Exponent Threshold Distribution
The previous solution is based on reliable multiple hop-by-hop deliveries of secret fragments, each fragment being the ith summand of a modular integer partition of the initiator's DH private key. The responder needs therefore to receive all messages from all proxies in order to be able to reconstitute the initiator's public key. A single missing message from a proxy makes the information incomplete for the responder and may block the protocol exchange.
Assuming that proxies behave as honest and reliable participants could be difficult in practice: even in scenarios where dedicated trustworthy proxies are made available to resource-constrained nodes, reliability of those proxies is not guaranteed. Hence, in case of unavailability or non-cooperative behavior of a proxy, a retransmission operation, optionally preceded by a new proxy assignment will have to take place and the proposed system will suffer additional latency.
In order to reinforce the reliability of the proposed distributed scheme, this kind of defective proxy play has been carefully considered in the design of our second proposed approach. We have implemented a robust technique that ensures a consistent recovery of the initiator's public key at the responder even in case of a proxy misbehaving or unreliability.
The enhanced distributed approach we propose is based on the use of a (k, n) threshold scheme, wherein the n proxies obtain a polynomial share instead of a partition element, k polynomial shares being enough to reconstruct the initiator secret through the technique of Lagrange polynomial interpolation. This threshold scheme satisfies the two properties that the integer partition solution fails to provide: 1) Recovery: The responder can recover the initiator's public key provided that a sufficient k values from proxies are received, without requiring the reception of all of them.
2) Secrecy: Nothing is learned about the secret exponent a even if k-1 shares of it are disclosed. In other words, data delivered to the responder through proxies in order to compute the initiator's public key will not reveal partial information about secret exponent.
Given a polynomial function f of degree k-1 expressed as:
k-1 with q 1 , q 2 , …, q k-1 are random, uniform and independent coefficients and q 0 = a.
Applying the Lagrange formula, the polynomial f can be retrieved as follows:
From (3), the secret exponent a can be computed given any subset of k values of f(x):
In order to bootstrap the threshold distributed key exchange, the initiator calculates n values f(1), …, f(n) of the polynomial f, with n > k, and sends each f(i) within the packet I21 i to the correspondent proxy P i . Each proxy computes then its part of the initiator's DH public key mod mod and sends it to the responder in the packet I22i.
Upon the reception of a subset P of k values transmitted by the proxies, the responder starts by computing the coefficients as follows:
Then, R computes the initiator's DH public key DH I based on Lagrange formula:
In order to prepare the computation of the DH session key at the initiator side, R starts calculating for each proxy P i (iP) the value mod ( being the ith coefficient calculated in the previous phase). P is unable to compute the coefficient since it has no knowledge about the subset P of concrete participating proxies. Having received this value, each proxy P uses its share f(i) of the initiator's private exponent to compute
. mod . Each proxy delivers then this computed value to the initiator I within the R22 i packet.
Upon reception of these k values, the initiator computes the DH session key K DH as follows:
By applying the threshold technique to improve the effectiveness of the distributed approach, the initiator is led to perform more computational operations in the initial phase, in order to calculate the n values of the polynomial that it sends to the n proxies. The cost of the computation can be better estimated if one considers another way of writing f(x), as:
. .
 (10) According to this expression, I performs for each computation of f(i): (k-1) multiplications between a scalar and a large number and (k-1) summations of two large number. It is worth noting that k and n are small numbers, smaller than the number of secure relationships that the initiator is able to maintain. On the other hand, the polynomial coefficients are as large as the DH private key of the initiator.
The two proposed approaches add a communication overhead due to message exchanging between the constrained initiator, the trusted entity T and the proxies. A performance analysis is therefore required to assess their respective efficiency and compare them with the basic approach used in HIP-BEX.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Cryptographic Cost
In order to precisely quantify the energy savings at the constrained initiator I, we have implemented the cryptographic operations it performs in both the integer partition approach and the threshold distribution approach. We have evaluated their computational energy costs using Crypto++ library [17] .
Test programs for individual cryptographic operations were run on an Intel i3 processor and the corresponding number of processor cycles for each was retrieved. In order to be able to induce the energy cost on a resource-constrained device from the number of cycles on a powerful processor, we disabled advanced features on our test processor (hyperthreading, multi-core, variable clock speed). Eventually we were able to consider that the energy cost for a sensor (E TelosB , expressed in Joules) can be derived from the number of cycles measured on the i3 (Ci3), under the following equation:
. α. C
Where  is a coefficient representing the richer instructions of the i3 and approximated to 2 in our analysis.
Computational cost results are compared to those required by the standard Base Exchange of the HIP protocol and presented in the Table 1 below: 
Communication Cost
In this subsection we assess the communication energy costs of the two distributed approaches at the constrained initiator. These costs are made of the costs of transmission, reception and listening. The energy consumption of a node in listening mode can be equivalent to its consumption in reception mode since the transceiver remains active in both modes (see Table 2 ).
Authors in [18] assess the energy cost of cryptographic algorithms is WSNs nodes and reveal the impact of listening on the total energy cost. However they did not consider this element in their estimates. Reference [19] includes the listening cost to estimate the energy cost of ECDH-ECDSA and Kerberos protocols on TelosB and MICAz sensors and insists on its importance comparing results with a prior work that estimates communication cost considering only transmission and reception costs. This comparison shows an energy overhead of 45% when the listening cost is taken into account. We use the power consumptions presented in the Table 2 as an energy model of the different operating modes (transmit, receive and listen) for the TelosB platform [19] . As reported in [19] we consider an effective data rate of 75 kbps for a 250 kbps claimed one. This important decrease of the data rate is discussed in [20] . From the previous exchange descriptions, we obtain that the number of exchanged bytes by the initiator in HIP BEX amounts to 608 sent bytes and 468 received bytes. In the integer partition approach, the initiator sends 2272 bytes and receives 1308 bytes. In the threshold distribution approach, it sends 2272 bytes and receives 1047 bytes.
In both approaches, the initiator is listening during a delay corresponding to the latency of communications (T x , R x ) and packets propagation (as well as the processing of packets at the proxies and the responder. We estimate below the listening durations required by the initiator in the considered approaches:
This duration is 403 ms for HIP BEX and 453 ms for either of the distributed HIP approaches, considering that the responder is an unconstrained node while proxies are 10 times less constrained than the responder. We also assume that the proxy is one hop far from the initiator and that a 200 ms propagation delay is required to route packets from the initiator to the responder.
Finally, the energy cost induced by communications in basic approach and both distributed techniques is shown in Table 3 . 
Total Energy Cost
Gathering the computation and communication costs, we provide the total energy costs for the three approaches in Table 4 below: As shown above, our estimated costs confirm the efficiency of the cooperative distributed scheme we propose. The energy savings at the initiator amount to 75% of what is consumed in HIP BEX.
The results also show that the energy costs of integer partition and threshold distributed approaches are almost similar, contrary to what may have been expected if one had only considered the overhead introduced by the generation of the polynomial shares in the threshold distributed approach. This latter certainly makes the secret partitioning more complex, but meanwhile it reduces the energy cost of messages processing at the initiator, which receives and deciphers k packets instead of n.
This result proves the viability of the threshold distributed approach in the studied context of IoT keying, which involves highly resource-constrained nodes such as the TelosB platform. Although being computationally more complex than the simple integer partition approach, the threshold distributed approach performs better when considered globally. Furthermore, it introduces the important recovery and secrecy properties, essential for a collaborative protocol such as D-HIP.
CONCLUSION
This paper presents the Distributed HIP Exchange (D-HIP) protocol, by which a constrained node can delegate its expensive computational load to assisting nodes, on a distributed and cooperative basis. In order to enable this collaborative scheme, two distributed techniques for the Diffie-Hellman protocol have been proposed. These techniques have then been assessed from the points of view of cryptographic and communication costs.
Simulations results first show that the proxy-based scheme significantly increases the energy savings at the constrained initiator compared to the standard base exchange of HIP protocol. They also show that the threshold distribution of the secret Diffie Hellman exponent should be the preferred approach for a constrained node taking part to a collaborative key exchange protocol such as D-HIP.
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